Exercise Franchise for Good Governance

Kamagra increase sperm volume Kamagra viagra uk buy kamagra buy viagra online Buy accutane cheap Amitriptyline online Compazine without prescription side efects lexapro zyprexa 2.5 mg dosage viagra alternatives otc Voltaren sale Buy cialis cheap prevacid and intrinsic ab Order Procardia Buy Bactrim cheap propranolol inderal side effects Advair Diskus online premarin 0.3 mg tablets clomid 150 mg success Phenergan without prescription Silagra uk Order Cleocin ranitidine mg kg dose Lithium purchase Ampicillin sale Periactin price celebrex lipitor Buy Abilify cheap plavix 25 mg seroquel xr 400 mgs zoloft and mentrual irregularities meclizine 25 mg rx diabetes and cephalexin singulair canine Anafranil online drug testing for zoloft purchase Micardis Methotrexate sale buspar with provigil purchase Diclofenac remeron know weeks Trazodone sale purchase Torsemide endep 10 mg tablets Zantac online purchase Digoxin Pyridium price Cymbalta discount alternatives to cymbalta Buy viagra cheap levaquin wstlaeagle achilles affect Baclofen without prescription trazodone 100 mg high buy Carafate Seroquel

Why We Do Not Vote

Democracy has proven to be the system of governance most capable of mediating and preventing conflict and of securing and sustaining well-being. By expanding people's choices about how and by whom they are governed, democracy brings principles of participation and accountability to the process of human development.


Taking efforts to cast one's ballot is a minimum expectation from the citizens of a democratic nation, not only from the perspective of political legitimacy but also from the broader human development goals that the HDR, 2002 brings out. Further, it is an indicator of self determination of citizens. A poor turn out may indicate that, those who abstain feel un-powered and perceive themselves as poor influencers in bringing out any change.   

 

India as a promoter of lobal Democracy Initiative asserts that we know from experience that democratic societies, which guarantee individual freedom and tolerance of dissent, provide an environment most conducive to creative endeavor, and the establishment of socially just societies.

 

Citizen participation in good governance practice is thus registering increasing attention at policy level. Voters turnout at elections is one indicator of citizen participation in democratic processes and can give a feel for citizens awareness; willingness and ability to contribute to representative governance. Unfortunately, increasing evidences suggest that it (voting) is a dying habit. Making a valedictory address on 12.02.06 at the 3rd National Conference on Electoral Reforms organised by ADR and Lok Samvad at Patna, the Chief Election Commissioner of India said Today for the Commission dwindling percentage of electors that come to vote is a major cause of concern. The electors do not come to vote either because of lethargy, indifference, preoccupation or intimidation. We have to make them understand that it is their own cause that is served by exercise of their franchise. I would urge civil institutions to take up the programme of voters’ education and awareness in a big way. The electors education has been a neglected field.   

 

One wonders about the causes of falling participation? Is it exorbitant opportunity cost, lethargy, indifference, or preoccupation, or some kind of intimidations or is it just the lack of awareness that shies away a voter? One also wonders if lowering the cost of participation can potentially reverse the trends.  Issue of greater significance however is do lower turn outs matter? And if so, how critical are they for our society at large?

 

Some theories in this regard are as below:

The first model to inquire into participation was the “calculus of voting model of Down (1957) and extended by Riker and Ordeshook (1968).The model in short involves expected benefits (potential benefits) and the costs involved. In the model, the expected benefits of voting equals the benefit (B) gained from preferring a candidate win rather lose multiplied by the probability (P) of casting a decisive vote. This expected benefit is nevertheless extremely low as the probability (P) is determined by two factors namely number of voters and closeness of the election. Next from the perspective of the rational voter is the calculation of the costs (C).The costs involved are opportunity costs and include the time to get registered, go to poll and return. It also includes the costs involved in accessing the information that facilitates choosing the preferred candidate. Time is a scarce resource so the standard conclusion is that given the small benefits a rational voter abstains as although the cost of voting is small the benefits are still smaller. But then the theory fails to explain the paradox why people vote. It is not uncommon to see that there are elections where there is often a clear majority and instances of candidates losing security deposits is also not uncommon. Some amendments have been proposed by rational choice theorists.

 

Seven amendment have been proposed in all. Citizens may decide to vote

(1) to maintain democracy (proposed by Downs 1957)

(2) out of sense of duty( proposed by Riker and Ordeshook 1968)

(3) because they are risk-averse and wish to avoid the regret of having not voted and seeing their preferred candidate lose by one vote

(4) because they reason that other citizens will not vote and their own vote could become decisive

(5) because group leaders and politicians make it easy for them to vote (

6) because the cost of voting is practically nil; and

(7) because they find it rational not to calculate benefits and costs when both are very small.  

 

Whatever be the amendments the rational choice approach has not been convincing enough regarding voters turn out although its contribution cannot be over diluted.   

 

The Resource model of Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995) talks about the costs involved. The resource model assumes that most of the action is in the cost section of the equation, whereas the rational model pays as much attention to expected benefits. In the resource model, people are inclined to vote if the costs is not too high; in the rational model, they weigh benefits and costs and vote only if they perceive the latter to smaller than the former.

 

Yet another model by Rosenstone and Hansen (1993), stresses the role of mobilization. To explain political participation the model argues to move beyond individuals to include family, friends, neighbours, co workers, political parties, interest groups etc. The idea is that people behave more as groups than as individuals. Rosenstone and Hansen assume that people want to be accepted valued and liked.

 

The Michigan model (1960) emphasizes the importance of partisanship or enduring party loyalties in voting behaviour. According to this model, strong partisan feelings contribute to electoral participation. Voters go to the polling booth to express their preferences towards parties and make their favored parties win. Therefore, the more intense electoral competition between rival parties is, the more people go to vote.  

 

And there are other views as well as Gregory Bresiger (2001) puts it as Tens of millions of Americans have stopped voting. No they are not lazy. No they are not irresponsible. No they are not indifferent or even apathetic. They are quietly protesting a fraudulent system and no longer see any advantage to taking part. They are making revolution through inaction.

 

Thus, studies so far have not been able to conclusively conclude what motivates a voter. The benefits associated with voting are complex and attempting to influence it requires change in public mindsets. Changing mindsets is a long drawn process, heavily dependent on prevailing culture, social values and individual preferences.   

 

It appears that dynamics of this public behaviour is more complex that we can list the factors involved. Good turn out in certain elections and clear majority to some winners are not uncommon. Huge participation in recent television shows like American idol, Indian Idol, Singapore Idol is mind-boggling and reminds us that people may in fact go a step further to bear even sufficiently higher costs if sufficiently motivated.   

 

Seen through the agenda of various NGOs working in India, falling participation rates seems to not attract much of concern. The concerns in India are primarily criminalization, and inner party democracy and some broad electoral reforms that include right to information about candidates profile like educational qualifications, property assets, funding of elections etc. The root of the problem however is the waning electors participation which through decisive voting can impact the quality of choices provided by political parties. It is a common understanding that there are continuing obstacles and disincentive to participation that could be diminished by adopting electoral systems or encouraging easier electoral access.

 

Of late, there has been an apparent merging of ideological conflict between the political parties. In pursuit of votes and as a reaction to the clientilist political environment (fuelled by decreasing participation), politicians have strong incentives to shift to special interest groups and core supporters to swing votes.  A neutral voter finds this perplexing, as he lacks choice between candidates and parties which to him appear all similar.   

 

Howsoever, nothing can beat an informed and enlightened citizenry. EFG wishes to bring this paradigm shift through continuous appeals.

 Human Development Report 2002 (http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2002/en/)

http://www.iacfpa.org/p_news/nit/iacpa-archieve/2005/07/29/tow8-29072005.shtml (excerpts from Indian Prime Minister Man Mohan Singh’s address to the Joint Session of Congress, United States  on July 19,2006) 

Andre Blais, To Vote or Not to vote? The merits and Limits of Rational choice theory University of Pittsburg Press, Pittsburgh 2000.

Andre Blais, To Vote or Not to vote? The merits and Limits of Rational choice theory University of Pittsburg Press, Pittsburgh 2000

[5]Gregory Bresiger; End of mandate, Chapter 21 in Dissenting Electorate, editors: Carl Watner, Wendy McElroy, McFarland& Company ,Inc., Publishers North Carolina 2001.

[6]Voter Turn out in Western Europe: International Institute for Democracy & Electoral assistance 2004, Sweden.